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CEO Pay and Layoffs
Whether CEO pay is linked with 
job loss or mass layoffs is not 
really a new question. In fact, I 
first started thinking about this 
nearly 20 years ago when I was in 
graduate school. I saw a provoca-
tive press release headlined “CEOs 
Win, Workers Lose” (Institute for 
Policy Studies, 1994). The piece listed the companies with 
the largest number of layoffs at that time and also listed 
the raises for their CEOs. The average raise for the CEOs 
was more than 30 percent; the report and others who took 
up its findings seemed to suggest that the layoffs caused 
the raises.
The implied causation intrigued me, so I figured I’d look a 
little deeper into the connection between CEO pay and mass 
layoffs. The first thing I did was calculate the median raise 
of those several dozen CEOs. This revealed that although 
the mean raise was 30 percent, the median was nearly iden-
tical to the 11 percent median increase for all CEOs of the 
top 800 U.S. publicly traded companies that year, regardless 
of whether their companies experienced layoffs.
The Simple, Baseline Link
My next step was to collect more data — a lot more data. 
The study that got me started, and raised very interesting 
issues about job loss and compensation, looked at CEOs 
at a few dozen companies over one year. I collected data 
from about 1,000 firms over seven years. Finding the CEO 
pay data for publicly traded companies was easy; collecting 
detailed information on employee layoffs was not (and 
required combing through many thousands of indexed 
newspaper accounts).
I added to the salary and layoff data a bunch of informa-
tion on CEO characteristics (e.g., age and seniority) and 
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company characteristics (e.g., size, share-
holder returns and market value). I then 
used some standard statistical techniques 
to probe the relationship between layoff 
announcements and CEO pay more care-
fully. The original results are reported in 
Kevin F. Hallock, “CEO Pay, Layoffs and 
Firm Performance,” American Economic 
Review, September 1998).
Separating companies into those that 
made a layoff announcement in the 
previous year and those that didn’t, 
you will find that the CEOs who made 
at least one large layoff the previous 
year make a lot more (about 40 percent 
in cash pay) than those who made no 
layoffs in the previous year. But, once 
one starts controlling for company and CEO attributes, 
essentially subdividing companies and their CEOs by other 
characteristics (like company size and CEO seniority), the 
findings change quickly. For example, we all know that 
bigger firms pay CEOs more (Kevin F. Hallock, “The Rela-
tionship Between Company Size and CEO Pay,” workspan, 
February 2011). It also turns out that, among publicly traded 
companies, bigger firms are more likely to have layoffs. 
So once we control for just the market value of the firm 
(or the number of employees, or assets — it doesn’t really 
matter), those CEOs leading firms that announced a layoff 
the previous year only make about 12 percent more than 
those who did not. And, after controlling for lots of other 
things (e.g., CEO age and experience, firm industry, stock 
returns and the like), there was absolutely no relationship 
between layoffs and CEO (cash) pay or pay raises.
But, isn’t a lot of CEO pay wrapped up in stock and stock 
options? What about that?
But What About All of the Stock and Options?
We all know that for any publicly traded companies in the 
United States, CEOs are not only frequently granted stock 
and stock options, but they can also hold considerable 
equity in their firms. So the natural next step would be to 
consider whether the stock market reacts to announcements 
of layoffs. Even if there is no relationship between CEO 
current pay and layoffs, if the stock market reacts positively 
or negatively to layoff announcements, there still could be 
substantial material effects on CEO wealth. I investigated this 
in a number of papers, including the one mentioned previ-
ously, a more recent one with Henry Farber (Henry S. Farber 
and Kevin F. Hallock, “The Changing 
Relationship Between Job Loss Announce-
ments and Stock Prices: 1970–1999,” 
Labour Economics, 2009, and in Kevin F. 
Hallock, “Job Loss and the Fraying of the 
Implicit Employment Contract,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Fall 2009).
What we found was a notable shift 
between the 1970s and 2000s in the reaction 
of the stock market to layoff announce-
ments. Specifically, the stock price reaction 
to layoffs was negative in the 1970s and 
became increasingly less so (on average) 
over 40 years when it ended most recently, 
weakly positive in the 2000s. We reasoned 
that in the 1970s layoff announcements 
would be met with immediate stock price 
declines (example: deficient demand in the U.S. automobile 
market at the time), and in the 2000s, layoffs might be met with 
stock price increases (example: efficiency and belt-tightening). 
In fact, we found evidence of just that.
What About CEO Firings?
Some ask: But don’t the CEOs get fired, too? Sometimes. In 
an additional paper with Sherrilyn Billger (Sherrilyn M. Billger 
and Kevin F. Hallock, “Mass Layoffs and CEO Turnover,” 
Industrial Relations, July 2005), we investigated the link 
between CEO turnover, mass layoffs and stock prices. Among 
our findings are that mass layoffs in firms are significantly 
related to CEO turnover the following year and, in some 
time periods, layoffs are strongly related to CEO turnover 
two years later. We also found that if the stock market reacts 
positively to a layoff announcement, the CEO is likely to stay 
on for some time. However, if the stock market responds 
negatively to the layoff announcement, the CEO is, before too 
long, also much more likely to exit the company.
As the U.S. labor market continues its slow climb out of the 
doldrums, how CEOs, other employees and firms fare after 
employee layoffs will continue to be an interesting topic, 
and there is a lot more interesting research to be done. 
... the CEOs  
who made  
at least one large 
layoff the previous 
year make a lot more 
than those who made 
no layoffs in the 
previous year. But ...
